I. INTRODUCTION
Evaluations of the extent and efficacy of Organization of African Unity (OAU) and African Union (AU) engagement with refugee protection seem to depend on who stands in judgment. Not surprisingly, the impression given by officials is one of a highly engaged and effective organisation:
As a continental organization, the OAU has been sensitizing its Member States as well as the international community at large to the plight of refugees and displaced persons. The OAU continues to provide education, employment and resettlement opportunities to refugees. In situations of large influxes of refugees, the OAU has made material and financial contributions to Member States confronted with the problem of assisting refugees, returnees and displaced persons upon recommendations by the Commissioners. . . . In recent years, the OAU has embarked upon promoting and strengthening the capacity of African non-governmental organizations . . . Some of them have received financial assistance from the OAU to enable them to carry out their projects in favour of refugees, returnees and displaced persons. . . . In the same vein, the OAU has been promoting cooperative partnerships with some sub-regional organizations. Such divergent views stem in part from the lack of exhaustive accounts of OAU and AU engagement with refugee protection. Indeed, that the two quotes above address different aspects of the regional body's engagement with refugee protection is a function of the almost complete dearth of material on the subject. 4 Despite the fact that Africa hosts almost a quarter of the world's refugees 5 and is the only region of the developing world to have adopted a legally binding refugee instrument, the limited impartial evaluations of the refugee work of the organisation responsible for adopting that instrument are either out of date 6 or focus on only one discrete aspect of engagement. 7 Informed by this existing body of, and other, secondary sources, primary archival and interview research conducted at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva and Addis Ababa, primary interview research conducted at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, and by primary OAU and AU materials, this paper attempts to consolidate knowledge of OAU and AU engagement with refugee protection from the time of the continental organisation's founding in 1963 up to the end of 2011. 8 It begins with an overview of each organisation. The paper's third section is devoted to what agenda of post-colonial state building, refugees were among the key issues on which the regional body focused. Refugee protection rose steadily in importance, through the adoption of the regional refugee convention in 1969 to the creation of various refugee protection bodies. Yet as the OAU's priorities shifted, which was evidenced most starkly with the formation of the AU, so too did the priority accorded to refugees. The AU was formed largely in light of concerns about conflict and economic growth; of late, it is primarily focused on security. Within its agenda, humanitarian issues are of considerable importance, and as a result refugee protection is slowly being subsumed within the AU's broader humanitarian portfolio. Whether this will be to the relative detriment of refugee protection on the continent remains to be seen; it is in part a function of the effectiveness of those early OAU initiatives that were exclusively focused on refugees. As will be demonstrated below, the OAU's exclusively refugee related work was not always effective. It was often a question of quantity over quality. The final concluding section argues that however it is framed -whether as part of its more general humanitarian work or otherwise -the plight of refugees in Africa demands that the AU now prioritise the effectiveness of its refugee protection initiatives.
II. THE OAU AND AU
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 to promote regional cooperation among newly independent African states. More specifically, the organisation's Charter 13 lists its purposes as promoting the unity and solidarity of African states; coordination and cooperation among them to improve the lives of African peoples; defending their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; eradicating all forms of colonialism; and promoting international cooperation.
14 Added to these goals were those of the Abuja Treaty 15 establishing the African Economic Community, which since 1994 was a second legal basis of OAU operations. Despite these lofty goals, the OAU was not created as a legislative body. Rather, OAU objectives were to be carried out primarily through the harmonisation of member states' policies. 16 This was to occur through the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHG), the OAU's 'supreme organ', 17 the role of which was to 'discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the Organization'. 18 The work of the AHG was to be operationalised by the Council of Ministers (CM or the Council), composed of member states' foreign or other ministers, and charged with implementing AHG decisions and coordinating inter-African cooperation in accordance with AHG instructions. 19 In addition to the AHG and the CM, the OAU was also composed of an Addis Ababa-based General Secretariat and a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. 20 Other bodies followed later in the organisation's development. For example, in 1993 the Mechanism of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established. 21 Composed of representatives of member states, the Mechanism was formed to prevent future conflicts and to engage in peace building for those that were ongoing. 22 The OAU, however, eventually came to be viewed as ineffective. Zard explains that the OAU's 'strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention and its subordination to state interest, combined with chronic financial difficulties, often precluded the organization from asserting any form of moral authority or leadership in tackling some of Africa's chronic problems'. 23 Such was especially the case in the face of modern challenges confronting the continent. Having focused on decolonisation and liberation from minority rule and committed to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, 24 the OAU was not equipped to deal with contemporary issues such as economic growth and conflict. The first major move to revitalise the regional organisation came in 1999 with the Sirte Declaration, which set out plans to establish what would become the AU. 25 This new body was born -superseding the OAU and incorporating the African Economic Community -on 26 May 2001, with the entry into force of its Constitutive Act. 26 The AU's objectives, as set out in its Constitutive Act, are more comprehensive than those of its predecessor. It aims to achieve unity and solidarity among African states and peoples; defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states; accelerate African political and socioeconomic integration; promote and defend common African positions; encourage international cooperation; promote peace, security and stability, democracy and good governance and human and peoples' rights; foster strong African participation in the global economy and international relations; promote 19 OAU Charter, supra note 13, article XIII. 20 OAU Charter, supra note 13, article VII. sustainable development, the integration of African economies and cooperation in all fields of human activity; coordinate and harmonise policies across the various regional economic communities; promote research; and engage in international cooperation for public health.
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The machinery to achieve this broad range of goals is more extensive than that of the OAU. The AU is composed of: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which determines common policies; the Executive Council, which is composed of ministers or other authorities designated by member states to coordinate such policies; the AU Commission, which is the regional body's Addis Ababa-based secretariat and handles eight discrete portfolios; 28 the PRC, which prepares the work of the Executive Council; the Peace and Security Council, which makes decisions on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts; the Pan-African Parliament, which is the AU's legislative arm, whose members are elected by the legislatures of AU member states; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, an advisory organ composed of social and professional groups from member states; the Court of Justice, which adjudicates disputes between member states stemming from AU legal instruments; the Specialized Technical Committees, which assist the Executive Council in substantive matters; and the financial institutions, which are the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank. The AU also includes ad hoc bodies, such as the Panel of the Wise, a panel of five eminent persons drawn from each of the continent's regions with a mandate to prevent conflict.
III. THE DRAFTING AND ADOPTION OF THE 1969 CONVENTION
It becomes clear from the above that the AU's explicit focus on human rights was not a feature of its predecessor; however, this did not prevent what is arguably Africa's most significant achievement in the field of refugee protection -the 1969 Convention -from emerging out of the OAU. Indeed, while refugee issues are today often viewed through the lens of human rights, the attention paid by the OAU to refugees was very much a product of its concern with liberating Africa from colonialism and minority rule. Nyanduga explains:
[t]he 1969 OAU Convention was adopted by African States at a time in history when the continent was gripped by the struggle for liberation, following the independence of many African States in the late 1950s and the 1960s. A considerable number of African States continued to be under colonial and foreign domination. Most of southern Africa was ruled by white racist regimes. . . . The struggle for independence and liberation in Africa prior to and after the creation of the OAU had forced the outflow of people from their territories escaping colonial oppression and foreign domination. While in exile, 27 AU Constitutive Act, supra note 26, article 3. 28 Peace and security; political affairs; infrastructure and energy; social affairs; human resources, science and technology; trade and industry; rural economy and agriculture; and economic affairs.
many of these people organized movements for the freedom and liberation of their countries. Freedom was won peacefully in many cases, while several African States won their independence through armed struggle. It is thus inevitable that historically, refugee outflow in Africa cannot be divorced from the struggle against oppression, both foreign and internal. 29 An overview of the important legal instrument that arose from this context and, subsequently, its drafting history, follows below. Despite the OAU's status as a largely coordinating, as opposed to legislative, body, it could nevertheless engage in international law making through the adoption of multilateral treaties. The 1969 Convention is one such instrument, governing the legal protection of refugees in Africa. It is relatively short, containing a preamble and fifteen articles. The first article provides two-part refugee definition. The first part mirrors that found at article 1A (2) the term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
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Article I also includes paragraphs on cessation 33 and exclusion. 34 Each paragraph closely follows the 1951 Convention, with three additions. The additional two cessation clauses provide that the 1969 Convention shall cease to apply to any refugee who has 'committed a serious non-political crime outside his country of refuge after his admission to that country as a refugee' 35 or has 'seriously infringed' the 1969 Convention's purposes and objectives. 36 A further point of distinction is that the 1969 Convention does not include the clause present in the 1951 Convention mitigating against cessation in respect of a refugee who can 'invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality'. 37 The additional exclusion clause adds 'acts contrary to the purposes and principles of' the OAU as a further ground of exclusion.
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Article II relates to asylum. States are urged to grant it and it is characterised as a 'peaceful and humanitarian act' that 'shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member State'. 39 Article II also provides for non-refoulement, responsibility sharing among African states, temporary protection, and that refugees who find asylum in states contiguous to their country of origin shall be settled at a reasonable distance from the border. The third article articulates refugees' duty to respect the laws and regulations of the host state, echoing article 2 of the 1951 Convention, and prohibits them from engaging in subversive activities against any OAU member state. This is operationalised by the cessation clauses described above, which terminate the refugee status of an individual who commits a serious non-political crime after the acquisition of such status or has seriously infringed the 1969 Convention's purposes and objectives. Article IV on non-discrimination in the application of the Convention follows article 3 of the 1951 Convention; however, discrimination is prohibited on the additional grounds of nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
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The fifth article relates to voluntary repatriation. Article VI, like article 28 of the 1951 Convention, mandates contracting states to provide refugees with travel documents. Articles VII and VIII relate to state cooperation with the OAU and UNHCR, respectively. Article VIII(2) provides that the 1969 Convention 'shall be the effective regional complement in Africa' of the 1951 Convention. The final seven articles are technical provisions.
Work on the issue of refugee protection in Africa began very soon after the OAU's formation, as evidenced by a 1964 resolution of the CM's Second Ordinary Session, held in Lagos. The resolution established an ad hoc commission consisting of ambassadors to the OAU from Burundi, Cameroon, Congo-Léopoldville (as it then was), Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanganyika (as it then was) and Uganda (the Commission) 41 to examine '(a) the refugee problem in Africa and make recommendations to the Council of Ministers on how it can be solved; [and] (b) ways and means of maintaining refugees in their country of asylum'.
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The process this resolution ultimately gave rise to is the subject of varied and conflicting accounts, in part because there are no official travaux préparatoires for the 1969 Convention. 43 These accounts can, for ease of analysis, be divided in to two categories. On the one hand are commentators on the 1969 Convention who address its drafting history only briefly, without reference to primary sources. They tend to note that the OAU's interest in a regional refugee instrument was a result of the failure of the persecution-based 1951 Convention refugee definition to reflect African realities. 44 On the other hand is the handful of writers who have addressed the 1969 Convention's drafting history in some depth. 45 Such accounts have consistently attributed the motivations behind the 1969 Convention to two factors:
[t]he first of these was the problem of subversive activities and the other the date line contained in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention. The latter meant that whatever was the legal scope of application of the 1951 Convention, it did not apply to the new refugee situations which had arisen in Africa. 46 The primary research conducted for this paper confirms this latter account. In particular, that early drafts of the 1969 Convention include only the 1951 Convention refugee definition (without the dateline) confirms that dissatisfaction with it was simply not a factor initially motivating the adoption of a regional instrument. 47 With these first two concerns -'that refugees might use countries of asylum as bases from which to seek the overthrow of the regimes from which they had fled' 49 and that the 1951 Convention then applied only to refugees in flight from events that had occurred before 1 January 1951 -in mind, the Commission proceeded to draft its first report. Drawn up in Addis Ababa in 1964, the report became 'guiding principles for [the] OAU's action in favour of refugees'. 50 The principles, many of which are reflected in the 1969 Convention, included the following:
1. Refugees who wish to return to their countries of origin must be helped to do so under the most peaceful and normal of conditions with a view to their complete integration. 2. In the countries of refuge, refugees must be settled, as far as possible, a long way from the frontiers of their countries of origin, for obvious security reasons, as much for the sake of the refugees themselves as for the countries of origin and of refuge. 3. The term 'refugee' will be limited to citizens of countries, the political, social, racial, or religious conditions of which have brought about a need for expatriation through fear or oppression, imprisonment or other similar difficulties. 4. Countries of refuge must in no case allow refugees to attack their country of origin. In the same way the countries of origin must not consider the harbouring of refugees as an unfriendly gesture, and must desist from any attack on the countries of refuge through the media of press or radio or by resorting to arms. 5. Countries which have a refugee problem must begin or continue bilateral negotiations, with a view to solving all the difficulties likely to arise by peaceful means and in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Organization of African Unity [including] the principle of the settlement of refugees away from the border.
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In addition, the Commission's report recommended that the OAU 'draft a special convention on the status of African refugees'.
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At its Third Ordinary Session, held in Cairo in July 1964, the CM took note of the report and, further to it, invited the Commission to 'draw up a draft Convention covering all aspects of the problem of refugees in Africa'. 53 The CM requested that the draft, once complete, be circulated by the OAU's Administrative Secretary General to member states, with a view to considering the draft and comments 49 The Kampala draft was presented to the CM's Fourth Ordinary Session, held in Nairobi in February and March 1965. Likely prompted by the state comments UNHCR had encouraged, the Council ultimately shared UNHCR's view that the draft suffered serious shortcomings. Accordingly, it established a committee of legal experts (the Committee of Legal Experts) to revise it. 65 The experts were nominated by the ten states represented on the Commission and were instructed to meet prior to 30 July 1965 in order to have the revised draft convention ready in time for consideration at the CM's Fifth Ordinary Session.
The OAU's Assistant Secretary General suggested that UNHCR should provide the Committee of Legal Experts with a draft convention to serve as a basis for its work. A memo authored by UNHCR's Jahn and titled 'Action to be taken by the Legal Division in connection with the Draft Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in Africa' explains:
Ambassador Sahnoun thought that since the Draft Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in Africa as it now stands [the Kampala draft], appears neither to meet the aims for which such an instrument was first envisaged by the OAU, nor to be in full harmony with the world-wide 1951 Convention, it would be preferable that the Committee of Legal Experts, when it meets in July 1965, does not adopt this Draft Convention. He rather had in mind a legal instrument much more concise and much more specifically relevant to Africa; he described a 'Protocole d'Accord' which should regulate relations between Member States with regard to refugee problems in Africa; it should inter alia deal with asylum (not a hostile act), with the obligations of refugees and of asylum countries, with the problem of voluntary repatriation, with the possibility of settling problems between Member States in conformity with Article XIX of the OAU 68 Indeed, the second draft convention, known as the Léo draft, was far from the Protocole d'Accord suggested by Sahnoun.
Rather, the Léo draft 'largely followed . . . the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, although the various standards of treatment provided for were not the same'. 69 Specifically, it contained a refugee definition, which reproduced the 1951 Convention definition without the dateline (article 1), and provisions concerning the general obligations of refugees (article 2); prohibition of subversive activities (article 3); non-discrimination (article 4); religion (article 5); rights granted apart from the convention (article 6); the term 'in the same circumstances' (article 7); exemption from reciprocity (article 8); exemption from exceptional measures (article 9); provisional measures (article 10); residence prior to the Convention (article 11); refugee seamen (article 12); personal status (article 13); moveable and immovable property (article 14); artistic rights and industrial property (article 15); right of association (article 16); access to courts (article 17); wageearning employment and self-employment (article 18); liberal professions (article 19); identity papers (article 20); travel documents (article 21); fiscal charges (article 22); transfer of assets (article 23); refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge (article 24); expulsion (article 25); prohibition of expulsion or return (article 26); naturalisation (article 27); and executory and transitory provisions (articles 28-38).
70
With these provisions, the Léo draft came closer to the wording of the 1951 Convention but still failed to win OAU approval because, in the eyes of many OAU members, it on the one hand, overlapped with the 1951 Convention and, on the other, was still far less liberal than the 1951 Convention since it reduced its standards. In the words of the OAU's Sahnoun, 'l'impression qui se dégage ici de plus en plus, est qu'en fait la convention adoptée à Léopoldville est encore moins libérale que la convention générale'. 72 Similarly, UNHCR's view of the Léo draft -like its opinion of the earlier Kampala draft -was that it would 'dangerously impair the universal value of the principles of the 1951 Convention, and would hinder efforts currently being undertaken to extend the Convention's scope'.
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With the OAU, many of its member states and UNHCR in agreement about the Léo draft's shortcomings, the two organisations worked together to move the drafting process forward. The OAU's Administrative Secretary General prepared a report for the October 1965 AHG meeting in Accra, highlighting the concerns his organisation and UNHCR shared. With the benefit of the OAU report, the AHG rejected the Léo draft and requested that the Commission 'provide legal experts at the highest level possible to re-examine the draft OAU convention on the status of refugees having regard to the views expressed by the Assembly at its present session and to report back to the Assembly'. 74 The AHG also requested that OAU member states that had not already done so 'ratify the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and . . . apply meanwhile the provisions of the said Convention to refugees in Africa'.
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According to Jackson, this request 'can be taken as the first clear indication that the African refugee convention should not cover the same ground as the 1951 Convention, the overriding character of which was implicitly recognised'. 76 Similarly, the then High Commissioner explained in his October 1965 statement to ExCom that most delegations at the Accra meeting had agreed that instead of creating a convention 'covering all aspects of the problem of refugees in Africa', 77 the OAU should 'recognise the universal principles of the 1951 Convention and supplement the latter with a view to regulating certain aspects of the refugee problems peculiar to the region in particular in so far as they concern relations between member states'. 78 Thus it was recognised that the regional instrument should not duplicate its international counterpart, but rather should address refugee problems particular to Africa.
Despite the consensus that emerged from the Accra meeting, the third draft convention, known as the Addis Ababa draft after the Committee of Legal Experts' September 1966 meeting there, 'still tended to cover the same ground 72 '[T]he impression increasingly coming out of this is that, in fact, the convention adopted in Léopoldville is even less liberal than the general convention'. as the 1951 Convention, though its provisions were more liberal than those of the preceding drafts and it contained new articles felt to be essential for dealing with the refugee situations in Africa'. 79 Jackson describes the Addis Ababa draft as being shorter than its predecessor because a number of the Léo draft's provisions corresponding to articles in the 1951 Convention were omitted. 80 Specifically, the Addis Ababa draft contained a preliminary conflict clause providing:
(1) [i]n all matters relating to the status, condition and treatment of refugees Member States shall, save as hereinafter provided, apply the provisions of the convention relating to the status of Refugees signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951, irrespective of the dateline and of any geographical limitation. (2) Should the provisions of this Convention conflict with any of those of the Convention of 28 July 1951, the provisions of this Convention shall prevail.
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It went on to provide a refugee definition replicating that of the 1951 Convention and including a second clause outlining factors to consider in determining whether the African convention would apply prima facie to groups of refugees. Other provisions related to asylum (article III); general obligations (article IV); prohibition of subversive activities (article V); extradition (article VI); rights granted apart from the Convention (article VII); repatriation (article VIII); wageearning employment and self-employment (article IX); liberal professions (article X); identity papers (article XI); travel documents (article XII); cooperation of the national authorities with the OAU and UNHCR (article XIII); and settlement of disputes (article XIV).
Like the Kampala and Léo drafts before it, the Addis Ababa draft failed to win the CM's support. At its Seventh Ordinary Session, held in October and November 1966 in Addis Ababa, the Council handed the job of drafting the African refugee convention over to the OAU Secretariat. 82 Furthermore, it expressed in no uncertain terms the consensus that had emerged informally from the Accra AHG, noting its desire 'that the African instrument should govern the specifically African aspects of the refugee problem and that it should come to be the effective regional complement of the 1951 United Nations Universal Convention on the Status of Refugees'. 83 This approach was inspired in part by the fact that by the time of the CM's Seventh Ordinary Session, the 1967 Protocol was well on its way to adoption, meaning that the 1951 Convention would soon be legally applicable in Africa. 84 Holborn describes the Council's Seventh Ordinary Session as 'a turning point in the drafting of the OAU Convention; from then on drafts almost totally omitted any reference to matters already covered in the 1951 Convention and concentrated instead on matters particularly affecting refugees in Africa'. 85 The Secretariat presented its draft convention, now the fourth to come before the CM, to that body's Ninth Ordinary Session, held in Kinshasa in September 1967. By this time, the 1967 Protocol had received three of the six accessions it needed to enter into force. 86 The imminent applicability of the 1951 Convention in Africa did not, however, obviate the need for a regional instrument. OAU member states agreed in Kinshasa that in light of its now complementary character, the regional convention remained necessary in order to address refugee situations specific to Africa. 87 Furthermore, certain African states -notably Nigeria and Uganda -were critical of the 1967 Protocol because, while it removed the 1951 Convention's temporal limitation, it failed to address refugee protection concerns particular to their region. 88 Yet while it was agreed that an African refugee convention remained necessary, the Council did not accept the Secretariat's draft, and the Committee of Legal Experts was sent back to work on what would be the fifth, and final, draft of the regional refugee convention.
An important source of inspiration to the Committee of Legal Experts in its final push on the convention -especially regarding the refugee definition -was the October 1967 Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problems, 89 jointly held in Addis Ababa by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), UNHCR, the OAU and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. The conference report 90 contained thirteen official recommendations, five of which 'were directed at legal aspects of the African refugee problems and were to have an important effect upon the shaping of the OAU Refugee Convention during the final stage of its drafting'. 91 One such recommendation 'was the first occasion on which the view was officially expressed that the 1951 Convention definition -while universally applicable -might not be sufficient to cover all refugee situations in Africa'. 92 Specifically, recommendation II advised
African countries that a new definition should be found for the term 'refugee', taking into account the specific aspects of the refugee situation in Africa. 93 Such 'specific aspects' were largely the result of persistent colonial domination and minority rule on the continent: the question of whether the African Convention extends protection to persons engaged in military struggle remains a controversial one. . . . This issue was discussed at length at the Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problem held in Addis Ababa in 1967. General consensus existed that the question of freedom fighters was intricately linked to the question of subversion. While support of freedom fighters intent on overthrowing a government of an independent African state could not conceivably be condoned in any way, it was accepted unreservedly that in a spirit of African solidarity it was the duty of every African country to assist freedom fighters who were fighting for the liberation of the African continent from colonial or racial domination. Such persons had no duty to abstain from activities aimed at overthrowing the internal structures in these colonial or minority-regime dominated countries. At any rate, African solidarity and the principles of the OAU as expressed in its Charter, clearly state that in seeking freedom for the African Continent, it is legitimate, indeed imperative to assist liberation movements. It was against this background that Article 1(2) was added to the general refugee definition taken from the 1951 Convention.
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At its Tenth Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa in February 1968, the CM took note of the conference report and drew the attention of member states and of the OAU's Administrative Secretary General to its recommendations. 95 The Committee of Legal Experts met in Addis Ababa in June 1968 to produce the fifth draft convention. They were provided by the OAU Secretariat with a report and, annexed thereto, a second Secretariat-produced draft, to serve as a basis for their work. 96 In light of the 1967 conference's second recommendation and the CM's endorsement of it, this Secretariat draft included the 1951 Convention refugee definition plus a second part in which 'external 93 The Egyptian delegation, supported by several others, followed up on the view it had first expressed at the 1964 AALCC meeting and specifically requested that this definition apply to refugees obliged to flee from their country due to aggression or subversion coming from outside their homeland ( The Committee of Legal Experts maintained the Secretariat's draft with only minor revisions, including to the second part of its refugee definition. Specifically, it replaced the word 'subversion' with 'disorder', considering 'subversion' to be ambiguous, 99 and abandoned the Secretariat draft's concept that someone could become a refugee within their own country. 100 The clause relating to the relationship between the regional instrument and its global counterpart was also amended to read, 'Member States shall apply the provisions of the United Nations Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees, as modified by the Protocol on the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967', 101 thereby eliminating the words 'save as herein provided', which would have made the regional instrument supreme in specified instances. 106 It has also been internationally influential in that it contributed to the 1984 adoption of the Cartagena Declaration, which recommends that the traditional refugee definition be expanded in Latin America to include 'persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order'. 107 While the Convention itself has been lauded, 'if the law relating to refugees is to be effective, it is essential not only that relevant conventions be adopted and ratified, but also that there exist an effective machinery for their implementation'. 108 The 1969 Convention did not establish any self-sustaining institutional mechanism, such as a treaty body, for its implementation, nor was any oversight authority designated. This fact has not gone unnoticed:
very little development took place following the adoption of the OAU Refugee Convention. Unlike the 1951 Convention where the UNHCR ExCom has created a body of soft law through regular ExCom Conclusions on a variety of protection-related topics, the OAU/AU failed to further develop and clarify the treaty obligations and standards. The OAU/AU has for a long time failed to devise effective mechanisms to supervise the implementation of the OAU Refugee Convention. 109 Yet the OAU did not fail to implement the 1969 Convention altogether. Rather, the Convention went on to underpin all OAU efforts in favour of refugees, reinforcing diplomacy, advocacy and political action. 110 The way Nyanduga sees it, 'the development of legal instruments . . . [has] been important in the sustenance of political consciousness about the refugee problem'. 111 Thus, the implementation of the Convention fell in a general sense to the OAU's political organs, 112 which often highlighted refugee issues through AHG and CM resolutions, decisions and declarations. 113 The OAU's Secretary General also regularly reported on refugees to the CM, and the OAU established dedicated refugee protection bodies, organised conferences focused on refugee issues and made special provision for refugees in other legal instruments adopted under its auspices. Each initiative in this regard is addressed in turn below, beginning with the OAU's refugee protection bodies.
IV. OAU ENGAGEMENT WITH REFUGEE PROTECTION: 1969-2002
A. OAU refugee protection bodies
The Commission of Ten/Fifteen/Twenty on Refugee Problems in Africa
Following the CM's 1964 recommendation that the Commission become a permanent OAU body, its work focused primarily on drafting the regional instrument; once the 1969 Convention was adopted, the Commission went quiet. It was revived at the CM's Nineteenth Ordinary Session, held in Rabat in June 1972, where the Council called on the OAU Secretariat to re-convene the Commission 'to consider the current situation of refugees in Africa and the necessary measures to be taken with a view to their assistance and voluntary repatriation and their resettlement'. 114 The ambassadors duly re-convened in Addis Ababa in December 1972, producing a report that was adopted by the CM at its Twentieth Ordinary Session, held in Addis Ababa in February 1973.
115 It was at this meeting that the Commission was first officially referred to as the Commission of Ten on Refugee Problems in Africa, 116 and thereafter it began to meet annually and submit regular reports on 'the situation of refugees, returnees and displaced persons in Africa, focusing on the contribution of the Organization in favour of those uprooted' 117 to the CM. The Commission thus became the main policy-making organ of the OAU on refugee matters. 118 Its activities included undertaking factfinding missions to states, providing governments with advice and the provision of emergency financial assistance to states in need. 119 Moreover, it worked to shape the OAU's response to refugee issues. 120 Okoth-Obbo likens the Commission to the UNHCR's Executive Committee. 121 In 1980, it was decided that the Commission's membership should rotate and that it should be expanded to include representatives from fifteen states: 122 initially, Angola, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire (as it then was), Zambia, Zimbabwe and two others to be chosen by north African states. 123 In 1994, the Commission was further expanded to a total membership of twenty states, whose tenure did not rotate. 124 These states were Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 125 Soon after its expansion to twenty states, the Commission's workings were formalised through the adoption of Rules of Procedure, which defined the functions of the Commission in almost exactly the same terms as had been used in 1964, when the Commission was first convened as an ad hoc body. 126 In 1998, the Commission was again enlarged, this time to include all OAU member states; 127 its Rules of Procedure were revised accordingly.
The Commission played an important role in shaping and communicating the OAU's approach to particular refugee situations. 128 Notably, it adopted the 1990 Khartoum Declaration on Africa's Refugee Crisis, which assessed national, sub-regional, regional and international responses to refugees in Africa and recommended follow-up action to be taken by the OAU and international community. 129 Yet, despite these achievements, Oloka-Onyango judged the Commission as ineffective: 
The Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees
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The BPEAR was created on 1 March 1968 further to recommendation XI of the 1967 Conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problems, 133 with the task of promoting the resettlement and employment of African refugees and collecting and disseminating information concerning educational, training and employment opportunities for them; 134 the intention was that the Bureau would function as a continental academic and occupational placement system for qualified refugees. 135 Its mandate, however, expanded in practice over time from seeking economic and educational opportunities for refugees to include functioning as an information conduit to member states and the international community on the patterns, causes and consequences of refugee movements in Africa; equipping refugees with resources to assist them in coping with their displacement and eventual repatriation; mediating between host states and refugees regarding alleged violations of national law; and working with UNHCR, voluntary agencies and member states to further the objectives of the 1969 Convention. Initially, BPEAR undertook these tasks as an autonomous body, entirely independent of the OAU and funded by outside sources (principally UNHCR), operating through a system of national correspondents -Bureau representatives placed within the executives of OAU member states. A standing committee of United Nations (UN) agencies -namely UNHCR, the International Labour Organization, the UNECA, the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Development Programme -advised it on operational matters and the Bureau received policy advice from a consultative board composed of the same agencies plus an OAU representative and observers from non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 137 In 1971, however, it was placed under the supervision of the OAU's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs. 138 In 1974, the Bureau was further integrated into the OAU Secretariat pursuant to the recommendations of a Commission report, becoming part of the OAU Secretariat's political department both organisationally and financially. 139 The 1974 restructuring also enlarged BPEAR's mandate to include legal assistance to refugees and rural resettlement programmes, and gave the Bureau a formal role in assisting the Commission in the formulation of the OAU's refugee policy. 140 Oloka-Onyango's exhaustive analysis of the BPEAR concludes that it has had great difficulty in meeting the conditions of its establishing mandate, and effectively expanding that mandate to deal with the critical issues concerning African refugees presently. The problems of the Bureau for Refugees basically stem from two factors: first, the fashion in which it has conceptualized its role, which is also a function of the influence of the OAU over its programming. The second issue relates to the question of finances.
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Others have echoed his view. Nobel, for example, explains that while potentially helpful, the BPEAR has been a disappointment due to what appears to be incompetence and mismanagement. A critical analysis has identified problems in the lack of efficient correspondents in member states, lack of economic support, and perhaps, weaknesses inherent in the OAU system itself. Perhaps as a response to such critiques, in the early 1990s BPEAR was renamed the Bureau for Refugees, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Assistance. 145 This further change did not solve its problems, however:
conceptually, the successive changes in the nomenclature of the bureau may reflect a metamorphosing mandate, and are in part reflective of the role that the bureau was supposed to play in the everchanging refugee situation on the continent. However, in practical terms the operations of the office have remained largely the same since its inception.
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Thus, not surprisingly, the transition from the OAU to the AU marked the demise of the Bureau for Refugees, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Assistance.
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Its Coordinating Committee did, however, survive -but under another name, as is explained below.
The Coordinating Committee (on Assistance to Refugees)
The standing committee and consultative board formed to advise BPEAR merged in 1970 to form the Bureau's Coordinating Committee. 148 In 1974, as part of the BPEAR restructuring described above, the Committee's membership was expanded to include representatives from the Executive Secretariat of the OAU's Liberation Committee and the Chairman of the Annual Conference of Liberation Movements, and its role was formalised. 149 Then, in 1981, the Coordinating Committee was renamed the CCAR and given a specific mandate to assist the OAU's Secretary General with the organisation of the two ICARA conferences (defined and described below). In spite of this specific mandate, the CCAR also evolved into an advisory committee to the Commission and a liaison body between the BPEAR and the outside agencies that provided it with organisational support and funding.
According to Oloka-Onyango, the CCAR was not as successful as it might have been in fulfilling its broader mandate. He explains that even in the admission of members of the CCAR, it is clear that the Committee has not done as much as it could have, particularly in terms of meeting financial commitments made to Bureau programmes. At present, this body is largely inactive, in part because of the relative malaise of the Bureau, but also because the members of the committee do not fully believe in its effectiveness, or in the capacity of the OAU to tackle the refugee question in a forthright, non-political fashion.
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Despite such manifest failures, the CCAR, like the Commission, survived the transition to the AU as the CCAPRRI, the work of which is described below in the section devoted to the AU.
B. Special refugee protection initiatives
In addition to establishing dedicated refugee protection bodies, the OAU has convened or co-convened a number of major conferences and meetings devoted to aspects of refugee protection in Africa. Twelve years after the 1967 Addis Ababa conference discussed above, the OAU co-hosted its next significant gathering devoted to refugees, the Pan-African Conference on the African Refugee Problem, held in Arusha from 7 to 17 May 1979.
152 While the conference was hosted by the OAU and UNHCR, with assistance from UNECA, it was an initiative of the All African Conference of Churches. The umbrella organisation sensed that a new refugee conference was needed primarily to document the sufferings and problems of large numbers of refugees before their existence could be denied completely by many political leaders of independent Africa. Equally important was the task of discussing these difficulties and possible solutions with the international community, the intergovernmental organizations, the nongovernmental organizations, and the voluntary agencies.
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The conference was attended at ministerial level by thirty-eight OAU member states, twenty non-African countries, five liberation movements recognised by the OAU, sixteen inter-governmental and regional organisations and thirtyseven NGOs involved in refugee work in Africa.
154 It adopted a range of recommendations, which 'can essentially be sub-divided into two categories. The first concerns the legal and protection problems of refugees, and the other concerns the social and economic, institutional, administrative and financial 156 The CM endorsed the conference's recommendations 157 and they subsequently received the support of the UN General Assembly. 158 Following the conference, the OAU and UNHCR constituted a joint working party for the implementation of its recommendations, which met for the first time in May 1980 in Addis Ababa and ultimately recommended a plan of action. 159 At its second meeting, the working group adopted model legislation for the domestic implementation of the 1969 Convention, which ultimately proved influential to how states parties incorporated it. 160 The next major conference to address refugee protection in Africa was convened not by the OAU but by the UN Secretary General further to a CM resolution, which invited
[t]he Secretary-General of the OAU in collaboration with the UN Secretary-General and . . . [UNHCR] to hold consultations with governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as governments of countries which are likely to offer contributions and the UN Specialized Agencies, in order to assess the possibility of holding a pledging conference for African refugees under the auspices of the United Nations. 161 The UN General Assembly subsequently noted the inadequacy of the assistance provided to African refugees 162 and the UN Secretary General, in cooperation with UNHCR and the OAU, accordingly convened the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA), to 'mobilize assistance for refugees in Africa'. 163 ICARA was held on 9 and 10 April 1981 in Geneva and raised approximately US$558 million; 164 however, none of these funds were allocated directly to the OAU; rather, they went to cover UNHCR programmes in Africa.
The OAU had by then, however, established a Special Refugee Contingency Fund, which received 2 per cent of the OAU's regular budget 165 and to which UNHCR contributed.
The OAU Secretariat convened a meeting of NGOs involved in assisting refugees in Africa from 21 to 25 March 1983 in Arusha. While not on the same scale as the Arusha meeting before it, the gathering's opening address was delivered by President Nyerere of Tanzania, suggesting that the refugee issue remained a high-profile one. The meeting produced a range of recommendations under twelve broad headings, 166 including 'Preparation for ICARA II'. Indeed, further to the success of ICARA, a second fundraising conference was at the request of the UN General Assembly 167 convened in Geneva from 9 to 11 July 1984. This time, however, funds were raised for UNHCR as well as to assist African host countries, fourteen of which submitted 128 proposals for specific infrastructural projects in advance of the conference. 168 ICARA II also resulted in the adoption by consensus of a Declaration and Programme of Action aimed at an effective long-term strategy for African refugees. 169 While preparations for ICARA II were ongoing, the OAU turned its attention from fundraising back to substantive issues, in particular to the situation of refugees from the racist regime ruling South Africa. At its Fortieth Ordinary Session, held in Addis Ababa in February and March 1984, the CM called on the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (now the Southern African Development Community) to organize, in collaboration with the OAU, UN and UNHCR, 'an international conference on all aspects of the refugee problem in Southern Africa, in order to co-ordinate and harmonize approaches to refugee matters'. 170 In July 1986, the CM called for substantive preparations to begin. 171 In 1994, the OAU and UNHCR co-convened the 'Commemorative Symposium on Refugees and the Problems of Forced Population Displacements in Africa'.
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The impetus for it came from two resolutions, one issued by UNHCR's ExCom 175 and the other by the CM. 176 Held from 8 to 10 September in Addis Ababa, the gathering commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the 1969 Convention and the twentieth year of its entry into force; it also had a substantive purpose, as evidenced by the thirty-four recommendations it produced in the form of the Addis Ababa Document on Refugees and Forced Population Movements in Africa. 177 The Document's ten topics 178 were broadly representative of the Symposium's main themes.
179 Among the recommendations, number five called on states to ratify, uphold, domesticate and implement the 1969 Convention. While the Symposium was a success in terms of the sheer number of participants it managed to attract -340 from OAU member states, other states, UN agencies and NGOs -it failed to advance thinking on substantive issues. Rather, any rigour, it also could not etch out clearly the essential legal, policy, and operational groundmarks for tackling those issues in a concrete and result-producing manner.
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Just as South Africa's apartheid regime had focused OAU attention on refugees in southern Africa, resulting in SARRED, the 1994 Rwandan genocide and ensuing refugee crisis led to a series of initiatives focused on the Great Lakes region. First was the OAU/UNHCR Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region, held in Bujumbura from 12 to 17 February 1995. This meeting resulted in a Plan of Action, later 'reiterated' by the UN General Assembly, 181 the implementation of which led to a series of follow-up meetings.
182 On 8 and 9 May 1998, the OAU and UNHCR held another regional meeting on refugee issues in the Great Lakes region, this time in Kampala. Around the same time, there was also a focus on refugee women and children as a particular population of concern: from 12 to 15 October 1998, the OAU convened in Addis Ababa its Regional Seminar on Enhancing the Participation of Returnee, Refugee and Internally Displaced Women and Children in Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Peace-Building. The seminar adopted a Plan of Action.
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While it is clear that many of the OAU's special refugee protection initiatives were organised in partnership with UNHCR and other UN agencies, one of the last refugee-related gatherings before the OAU became the AU was an exclusively OAU affair: the OAU Ministerial Meeting on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, held in Khartoum on 13 and 14 December 1998. The meeting produced both a Declaration 184 and recommendations. 185 The former, inter alia, appealed to states to ratify the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as the 1969 Convention and to domesticate and implement them. The latter consisted of thirty-four recommendations grouped under seven broad themes.
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The OAU's final special refugee protection initiative, co-organised with UNHCR, was a meeting of government and non-governmental experts held Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa' (OAU Khartoum 14 December 1998). 186 Root causes; refugee instruments; strengthening refugee protection in Africa; durable solutions; consolidating the reintegration process; building Africa's capacity to respond to refugee and internal displacement situations; and assistance and resolving the problem of internally displaced persons in Africa.
in Conakry from 27 to 29 March 2000, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption of the 1969 Convention. This meeting 'consolidated the OAU's approach [to refugees] and directed the way in which it would operate in the future' 187 and resulted in a Comprehensive Action Plan, 188 which was subsequently endorsed by the CM 189 and referred to by the AHG. 190 Among the recommendations contained in the Action Plan, one suggested that UNHCR and the OAU convene a working group to consider amendments to the 1969 Convention, including the designation of an oversight body. 191 Another directed UNHCR to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in order to strengthen 'its monitoring capacity and programme of work with respect to the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers'. 192 The Memorandum of Understanding was ultimately concluded in 2003; the recommendation concerning the 1969 Convention, by contrast, has yet to be implemented.
While this and indeed most of the recommendations flowing from the OAU's various special refugee protection initiatives seem sound, there is reason to be sceptical. An NGO delegate to the 1994 Commemorative Symposium remarked, there is no shortage of declarations, recommendations, or plans of action to solve the refugee and displacement crisis in Africa. If even half of these were to be implemented, there would be virtually no refugees or displaced persons in Africa today and none for the whole of the twenty-first century. 193 The sheer number of declarations, recommendations and plans of action emanating from gatherings in Africa devoted to refugees evidences the essential truth of this somewhat sweeping observation; if even one plan of action were to be fully implemented, there would likely be little need for all those that came after it. Indeed, Okoth-Obbo notes that a number of conference documents have not shown a record of implementation commensurate with the effort and cost of their elaboration. 194 Perhaps of greater value, therefore, are legally binding instruments. Two relevant to refugees have been adopted under the auspices of the OAU, in addition to the 1969 Convention.
C. Other legal instruments
The African Charter was adopted in 1981 and entered into force five years later. Its civil and political and socio-economic rights guarantees are owed to 'every individual';
195 the African Commission has clarified that the rights in the Charter are therefore owed to nationals and non-nationals alike. 196 Refugees thus benefit from the protection of the Charter during the period of asylum. Thus, as Nyanduga explains, 'a refugee whose rights are violated by a member State, either country of origin . . . [or] host state, can have recourse to the African Commission . . . under the individual communications procedure '. 197 Of particular relevance to refugees are article 5 prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CIDT), which has been interpreted as protecting an individual from being returned to a state where he or she is likely to face torture or CIDT;
198 article 12(3) on the right to seek and obtain asylum, which bolsters -though likely does not enshrine -an individual right of asylum; article 12(4) prohibiting the arbitrary expulsion of non-nationals; and article 12(5) prohibiting the mass expulsion of non-nationals. How these provisions have been interpreted in favour of refugees is addressed below in the section on the African Commission.
Like the African Charter, the Children's Rights Charter is relevant to refugees in a general sense; however, it also contains a refugee-specific provision. Its article 23 provides in part:
1. States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by parents, legal guardians or close relatives, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of the rights set out in this Charter and other international human rights and humanitarian instruments to which the States are Parties. 2. States Parties shall undertake to cooperate with existing international organizations which protect and assist refugees in their efforts to protect and assist such a child and to trace the parents or other close relatives of an unaccompanied refugee child in order to obtain information necessary for reunification with the family. 3. Where no parents, legal guardians or close relatives can be found, the child shall be accorded the same protection as any other child permanently or temporarily deprived of his family environment for any reason. That the Children's Rights Charter, adopted almost a decade after the African Charter, explicitly addresses refugees, while its more general predecessor does not, suggests a shift in the OAU's view of the issue. Initially, refugees were seen as a threat to inter-African relations; later, their connection to development came to the fore; finally, the increasing regard paid to human rights resulted in a recognition of the linkages between human rights violations and forced population displacement. Nyanduga has observed the first change: '[t]he refugee problem was increasingly seen not merely as a destabilization and subversion concern, but also recognized to constitute a major drain of scarce resources and an impediment to development'. 199 The complete shift -from subversion to development to human rights -is evidenced by the ninth paragraph of the Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action (Grand Bay Declaration), the result of the First OAU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights held from 12 to 16 April 1999. It provides:
[w]hile welcoming the improvements which have taken place in addressing the refugee problem, the conference believes that the high number of refugees, displaced persons and returnees in Africa constitutes an impediment to development. It recognizes the link between human rights violations and population displacement and calls for redoubled and concerted efforts by States and the OAU to address the problem. 200 Indeed, recognition of the importance of human rights contributed to the decision to replace the OAU with the AU. Thus it is not surprising that the connection between the protection and promotion of human rights on the one hand and refugee protection on the other constitutes a salient feature of AU engagement with refugee issues.
V. AU ENGAGEMENT WITH REFUGEE PROTECTION: 2002-11
If the Grand Bay Declaration foreshadowed the AU's approach to refugees, then in calling on member states to recognise forced displacement as a grave violation of human rights to peace, security and dignity, 201 the Kigali Declaration -the result of the First AU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights -consolidated it. This shift in approach was in part the result of changing patterns of forced displacement. When the OAU first addressed refugee protection with the 1969 Convention, 'the major cause for refugees was the problem related to colonial occupation' 202 but 'as the years went by, civil wars and ethnic conflict in many member States became a major cause of refugee outflow'. 203 In addition to focusing attention on human rights, new causes of displacement widened the AU's focus: whereas the OAU had primarily been focused on refugees, the AU paid equal attention to IDPs and returnees.
While the shift from the OAU to the AU heralded a more rights-based approach to refugees and brought IDPs and returnees to the fore, the transition was also a missed opportunity. The adoption of the AU's Constitutive Act raised the prospect of creating a dedicated continental refugee protection body, 204 or at the very least the opportunity of designating a body with supervisory authority over the 1969 Convention. Neither of these opportunities was seized. Instead, the AU developed a number of bodies responsible for refugee issues, albeit with distinct political, advisory and technical roles. What these bodies have in common, however, is the experience of mission creep. If the transition from the OAU to the AU was initially marked by IDPs and returnees assuming increased importance, now, over a decade after the AU's establishment, refugee protection is gradually being subsumed within the AU's broader humanitarian work, as will be shown below.
A. AU refugee protection bodies
The Permanent Representatives Committee's Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons
The PRC is a political body composed of representatives from each AU member state and is charged with assisting and preparing the work of the Executive Council. Its Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, a committee of the whole, is the AU incarnation of the former OAU Commission on Refugee Problems in Africa. It is a decision-making body, acting on its own as well as by raising issues to the Executive Council. 205 In particular, it provides political leadership in formulating AU responses to humanitarian emergencies, informed by field missions and in-country needs assessments; 206 where possible, provides refugee hosting states with financial assistance; and works to sensitise AU member states and the international community to the plight of displaced persons in Africa. 207 The Sub-Committee is chaired by the Republic of Guinea; Mozambique serves as deputy chair. As a committee of the whole, the Sub-Committee is represented by a bureau of five member states, which meet as often as is necessary. The complete Sub-Committee meets twice per year.
Despite its refugee-focused nomenclature, the PRC Sub-Committee views its mandate in broader terms, as encompassing humanitarian affairs more generally. 209 This may be due in part to the degree to which it relies on and defers to HARDP. Lacking in refugee protection experts among its ambassador members, the PRC Sub-Committee relies heavily on HARDP, with which it works closely and which is its secretariat. HARDP's mandate is not limited to refugees but includes humanitarian affairs more generally; it is not surprising that this broader focus has impacted upon its political counterpart.
The Coordinating Committee on Assistance and Protection to Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons
This advisory body was born under the OAU as the BPEAR's Coordinating Committee, and later became the CCAR. As an AU organ, it is known as the CCAPRRI. Committee membership is open to AU member states, relevant UN agencies, inter-governmental organisations and NGOs. 210 A subset of CCAPRRI members resident in Addis Ababa form the body's Working Group, which has a mandate to assist HARDP in its day-to-day activities 211 and prepare the work of the Committee as a whole. (d) ensure wide dissemination of important resolutions and decisions adopted by relevant AU organs; (e) establish modalities and/or plans of action, including a mechanism for monitoring and reporting to the PRC Sub-Committee on Refugees on the implementation of relevant resolutions and decisions; (f) coordinate efforts of members of the CCAR in order to harmonize their policies and activities and ensure complementarity in their programmes relating to refugees, returnees and IDPs; (g) mobilize support for capacity and institution building activities of member organizations, refugee hosting countries and other organizations particularly indigenous African NGOs involved in the protection and assistance to refugee, returnees and IDPs; (h) assist and support the AU and member oganizations in mobilizing resources necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the Coordinating Committee and the implementation of planned activities; (i) assist and support the AU and member organizations in mobilizing support and resources for refugees, returnees, IDPs and other related humanitarian activities; (j) provide early warning and advice on the prevention of large-scale forced population displacement and humanitarian catastrophes, and support African countries and communities hosting refugees and IDPs on adequate, timely and appropriate preparedness, and response to emergency situations; as well as advocate for comprehensive peace building, reconstruction and development for countries emerging out of conflict to ensure that the needs of displaced persons are addressed; (k) undertake any other assignment as, and when, necessary and requested by the AU Commission and/or the AU decision-making organs; (l) play the role of advocacy on issues related to refugees, returnees and . . . [IDPs] regarding their assistance and protection on humanitarian needs.
213
Despite this wide mandate, in practice the CCAPRRI focuses on its function as an advisory body to the PRC Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, providing 'a forum and interface between the [refugee] practitioners and the [AU's] decision-making and policy organs '. 214 Activities that would fall under its other functions are often overlooked. For example, at a 2003 meeting between UNHCR and the African Commission, it was suggested that CCAPRRI should 'examine the feasibility of promoting the adoption of a Protocol to the 1969 . . . Convention which would expand its scope to cover issues not adequately addressed therein'.
215 Such never occurred. Moreover, even in its limited role as an advisory body to the PRC Sub-Committee, CCAPRRI is remarkably weak. The AU Commission and UNHCR began working together to revitalise the CCAPRRI, in particular by updating its membership, in 2004 further to a request from the Executive Council. 216 The request was reiterated in January 2005 'as a matter of urgency'. 217 According to Tigere and Amukhobu, new members were secured by mid-2005, 218 when the Executive Council commended the AU Commission and UNHCR for their efforts in this regard. 219 Further revitalisation followed: the Committee's 2006 Rules of Procedure entered into force when they were adopted by the AU's Executive Council in 2008 220 and a renewed search for additional members began in 2009 221 and remained ongoing as of early 2012. 222 Despite these procedural revitalisations, the CCAPRRI has remained substantively dormant. In the 2008 decision that adopted the Committee's revised Rules of Procedure, the Executive Council also requested that the AU Commission 'reactivate the Coordinating Committee as soon as possible'. 223 Such has not occurred in any meaningful way. In 2011, the CCAPRRI Working Group convened a task force to revitalise the Committee, 224 yet as recently as early 2012, relevant officials in Addis Ababa described CCAPRRI as 'dormant' at best and, at worst, as 'defunct'. Moreover, as of January 2012 the body's 2011 annual meeting -which is supposed to be held every October under the auspices of HARDP, the Committee's secretariat -had yet to occur. 225 Indeed, CCAPRRI has not met since 2010. 226 Despite the CCAPRRI's inactivity, its 2011 annual meeting -when it eventually occurs -is set to expand the Committee's mandate to cover humanitarian assistance generally, with a corresponding name change to the Coordinating Committee on Humanitarian Affairs. 227 Whether this shift will finally revitalise the body or will just serve to dilute its already weak refugee protection role thus remains to be seen. If the latter, it will represent a significant missed opportunity. In CCAPRRI, there is a framework through which the AU could receive support, advice and assistance -after all, CCAPRRI's Rules of Procedure mandate its Working Group to assist HARDP in its regular activities -as well as a link between the AU's policy-oriented work and the operational activities of Committee member organisations. That CCAPRRI is currently not functioning is to the detriment of HARDP and hence the AU's refugee protection activities more generally.
The Division of Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons
HARDP is a division of the AU Commission's Department of Political Affairs. It is a technical body that functions as a secretariat to the political PRC Sub-Committee and the advisory CCAPRRI, in particular by facilitating their activities, decision-making and policy development. 228 For example, HARDP prepares the first draft of CCAPRRI's annual report, 229 as well as the first draft of all PRC Sub-Committee reports for AU summits.
230 HARDP also coordinates the interface between the AU's humanitarian actors and its decision makers, 231 and takes the lead on all the technical aspects of the AU's policy in respect of refugees in particular and humanitarian affairs in general. For example, HARDP is currently leading the drafting of the AU's Humanitarian Policy Framework. According to Tigere and Amukhobu, HARDP is central to the 'coordination, documentation and liaison of the work of the AU Commission, AU organs and other partners on matters related to forced displacements'.
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In its own words, HARDP has a mandate to:
[p]rovide assistance in collaboration with other departments and relevant agencies/organizations to refugees, displaced persons and victims of humanitarian crisis; Harmonize policies and activities among countries and . . . [regional economic communities], including the repatriation and resettlement of displaced persons; Promote cooperation with relevant regional and international organizations; Promote international humanitarian law; [and] Seek for a lasting solution to the problems of refugees and displaced persons.
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Another HARDP source described its main activities -presumably undertaken with a view to discharging the above functions -as visiting AU member states 228 affected by displacement, participating in meetings and seminars and monitoring the humanitarian crises that produce mass movements of population on the continent. 234 Some practical examples of its work in this regard are described below in the section devoted to special AU refugee protection initiatives.
Despite its largely technical mandate, HARDP is enormously powerful. Due to CCAPRRI's inactivity and the lack of significant refugee protection expertise among the diplomats who sit on the PRC's Sub-Committee, HARDP has almost exclusive control over the PRC Sub-Committee's programme of work. Among its agenda items, the PRC Sub-Committee selects certain of them to raise to the AU's Executive Council, which in turn may raise issues with the AHG. Thus HARDP -a technical division meant to serve as a secretariat to the political and advisory arms of the AU's refugee protection apparatus and staffed by only four overstretched individuals (one of whom is seconded from UNHCR) -exercises de facto control over the AU's entire refugee protection agenda. Given this power, it is perhaps not surprising that HARDP sometimes fails at its more clerical tasks, such as convening CCAPRRI's annual meeting. Moreover, it is important to note that refugee protection is only one among HARDP's many concerns: as is evident from its name, the division also has a broader humanitarian affairs mandate, which its current Director is keen to embrace. 235 Save for those aspects of refugee protection that may fall within the mandates of the Department of Political Affairs' other divisions -such as Social Affairs -AU engagement with refugee protection is effectively controlled by four individuals for whom refugee protection is only one among a host of concerns.
B. Special refugee protection initiatives
Although the AU has never held an inter-organisational gathering along the lines of the OAU's 1967 Addis Ababa conference or its 1979 Arusha meeting, 236 like its predecessor it regularly convenes ministerial meetings on refugees, returnees and IDPs in Africa. The first such AU meeting was held in Ouagadougou on 1 and 2 June 2006 -eight years after the OAU's ministerial meeting in Khartoum -at the behest of an Executive Council decision adopted the previous year. 237 The meeting resulted in the adoption of the Ouagadougou Declaration 238 and during the gathering it was decided that ministerial meetings devoted to forced displacement should be convened every two years. and, most importantly, adopted the landmark Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, perhaps the most significant illustration of the way in which IDP protection has come to the fore in the AU. 240 The AU Commission, and hence HARDP, was tasked with implementing the Kampala Declaration and was requested to formulate a Plan of Action in that regard. 241 To build consensus around and formalise its draft Plan of Action, on 4 and 5 June 2010 HARDP convened the third meeting of ministers in charge of forced displacement matters in Addis Ababa. The ministers adopted HARDP's Plan of Action and it was subsequently welcomed by the Executive Council. 242 A consultative meeting aimed at its implementation was convened by HARDP on 20 and 21 May 2011 in Kinshasa.
In addition to special initiatives devoted to them, refugees have also received the attention of more general AU initiatives. The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, a policy development process, notes among its 'core values' that the 'plight of African refugees and internally displaced persons constitutes a scar on the conscience of African governments and people' and provides an undertaking to strengthen refugee protection. 243 Moreover, among the Conference's key performance indicators, all AU member states were expected to have ratified and implemented the 1969 Convention by 2003; it was proposed that the AU should review the Convention's scope by 2005, ensuring in particular the strength of oversight mechanisms; and states were requested to provide the Conference with information on the condition of refugees, the protection of their human rights and mechanisms for the mitigation of their situation. 244 While such effective implementation of the Convention has yet to occur, the range of binding legal protections applicable to refugees has expanded under the AU.
C. Other legal instruments
In 2003, the AU adopted the Women's Rights Protocol. It contains several provisions devoted to refugees. Article 4 on the rights to life, integrity and security of the person commits states parties to ensuring that 'women and men enjoy equal rights in terms of access to refugee status determination procedures and that women refugees are accorded the full protection and benefits guaranteed under international refugee law, including their own identity and other documents'. 245 Article 10 on the right to peace further commits states parties to ensuring the increased participation of women 'in the local, national, regional, continental and international decision making structures to ensure physical, psychological, social and legal protection of asylum seekers, refugees, returnees and displaced persons, in particular women' 246 and 'in all levels of the structures established for the management of camps and settlements for asylum seekers, refugees, returnees and displaced persons, in particular, women'. 247 Finally, with article 11 on the protection of women in armed conflict, states parties undertake to protect asylum seeking women, refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons, against all forms of violence, rape and other forms of sexual exploitation, and to ensure that such acts are considered war crimes, genocide and/or crimes against humanity and that their perpetrators are brought to justice before a competent criminal jurisdiction.
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VI. THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS
The African Commission derives its mandate to 'promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa' 249 from the African Charter and began operating from its seat in Banjul in 1987. It was until 2006 the AU's -and the OAU's before it -principal human rights body. Since then, it has shared this role with the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. 250 The Court's decisions are binding, unlike those of the Commission; 251 however, individuals and NGOs do not have automatic standing before the Court, but do before the Commission. As a result, the Commission remains the more active of the two bodies, especially in relation to refugees, with which the Court has not engaged at all.
One of the earliest examples of African Commission engagement with refugees was the appearance of the issue on the agenda of its Eighth Ordinary Session in 1990. 252 Not long after, in February 1994, the Commission co-hosted a Harare seminar titled 'African Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons'. 253 The Commission has also regularly highlighted refugees as being among the vulnerable groups in need of special protection. 254 Yet, despite these initiatives, Commission engagement with refugee protection did not commence in earnest until it began collaborating with UNHCR. An early example of such collaboration was a December 1998 workshop of the two organisations in Dakar. 255 The following year, UNHCR attended the Commission's Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session in Kigali, where discussions were held about cooperation between the two bodies. 256 This led in 2000 to the recommendation of the Conakry meeting discussed above: that UNHCR and the African Commission should conclude an agreement aimed at strengthening the Commission's monitoring capacity and programme of work regarding the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers.
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Further discussions were held on 20 and 21 March 2003 at an Addis Ababa meeting of UNHCR and the Commission. This meeting concluded that refugees are endowed with the same rights and responsibilities as all other human beings. The specific rights of refugees are an integral part of human rights and are universal, indivisible, inter-dependent and inter-related. Where national laws on refugees are inadequate or non-existent, general human rights law should therefore be invoked to protect refugees. 258 The meeting also recommended, inter alia, that the African Commission should become a member of CCAPRIDP 259 and, importantly, that it should monitor the implementation of the 1969 Convention. 260 This call was reiterated two months later in an expert report that emanated from the AU's First Ministerial Meeting on Human Rights, held in Kigali on 5 and 6 May 2003. 261 The Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and UNHCR was signed shortly after the Kigali meeting, on 26 May 2003 during the Commission's Thirty-third Ordinary Session; its imminent signature had been in the promotion and protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons; f. develop and recommend effective strategies to better protect the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons in Africa and to follow up on his recommendations; g. raise awareness and promote the implementation of the UN Convention on Refugees of 1951 as well as the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa; h. submit reports at every ordinary session of the African Commission on the situation of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons in Africa.
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Not surprisingly given his role, Nyanduga maintains that 'the continued use of the African Commission as a forum for discussion of refugee rights issues is an important protection mechanism for refugees'. 267 Yet, others are sceptical. According to Murray, the African Commission . . . cannot be said to have developed a coherent policy on human rights and refugees and displaced persons. In addition, until recently, the OAU/AU organs and the African Commission . . . seemed to operate, in this area as well as many others, in splendid isolation. Neither referred to each other's documents or jurisprudence in their own work or drew upon each other to enforce decisions or recommendations.
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That the Commission has failed to adopt a coherent refugee policy within its promotional mandate points to the importance of its protective mandate as a source of refugee protection standards. Indeed, the African Commission has issued several decisions elaborating the role of the African Charter for refugees, some of which are discussed below.
The body of law that can be applied by the Commission is broad. According to article 60 of the Charter,
[t]he Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples' rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human and peoples' rights as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are members. 266 Ibid., para. 1. 267 Nyanduga, 'Refugee Protection', supra note 29, p. 103. 268 Murray, 'Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons and Human Rights', supra note 198, p. 61. quality and rhetoric over reality: while there is no shortage of OAU and AU legal instruments, standards and mechanisms, it is not clear that they have prevented displacement or produced better outcomes for refugees.
The transition from the OAU to the AU represented a significant opportunity to change this. While 'non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another' 275 remains an AU principle, the new continental body is not as strictly bound by the provision as was the OAU. 276 Rather, in the AU there is the right 'to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity', 277 which have been the cause of some of the continent's worst refugee crises. Moreover, the AU's focus on democracy, social and economic development, peace and security and human rights is more in line with refugee protection than its predecessor's preoccupation with decolonisation and the consolidation of the post-colonial state. Finally, the establishment of the AU was a fortuitous moment for institution building. Indeed, the AU has established a trifecta of bodies focused at least in part on refugee protection, with neatly parsed out political, advisory and technical mandates.
Yet while there are three AU organs for refugee protection, control is ultimately concentrated in a small division of technocrats. Moreover, the standards and initiatives emanating from HARDP, though they may percolate up through the levels of the AU and result in high-level decisions and resolutions, are rarely if ever effectively implemented by member states, as evidenced by the scale of the refugee problem in Africa and the dire conditions in which refugees live. The AU's legal foundations permit high expectations in the field of refugee protection and the number of and conditions for refugees in Africa now demand them. It is time for the AU to rehabilitate its moribund refugee-focused institutions and for all of them -the PRC Sub-Committee, CCAPRRI, HARDP and the African Commission -to focus on the quality of initiatives over their quantity. Equally, it is time for member states to effectively implement AU directives; part of the responsibility for ensuring this rests with the AU itself. Moreover, the AU must ensure that the important attention it is paying to IDPs, returnees and humanitarian affairs generally does not come at the expense of refugees' specific needs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, however refugee protection is framed, the AU must ensure that its refugee protection activities are effective.
